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1. Introduction 
 
Study of the structure of wages has been a preoccupation of economists for a long time and 
dates back at least as far as Adam Smith. Until about 15 years ago economists commented on 
the remarkable stability of the wage structure in the post-war period. In the early 1990s, 
however, many empirical studies (e.g. Bound and Johnson, 1992) noticed that wage 
inequality in America had risen dramatically since the late 1970s. Other countries, notably 
the UK, also saw a significant increase in wage inequality at about the same time (Machin, 
1996). These observations kick started what has become a huge empirical and theoretical 
literature seeking to measure and explain changes in wage inequality (see the survey of Katz 
and Autor, 1999). Since wages are a major part of people’s income and economic well being, 
the increase in wage inequality feeds through to income, consumption and poverty rates. So 
understanding the patterns of wage inequality is important from a normative as well as 
positive perspective. 
In this paper we examine what has happened to the wage distribution in the past 40 
years, looking principally at the US where the bulk of the economic research has focused, but 
where possible also examining other countries. Section 2 describes the observed changes in 
the structure of wages (although we fully acknowledge there are some contentious, and as of 
yet unresolved, issues about the observed patterns of change). Section 3 looks at the main 
explanations of the observed changes that have emerged from the large body of work in this 
area.  Section 4 offers some conclusions. 
 
 
2. What Has Happened to the Wage Distribution? 
 
2.1 Overall Trends in US Wage Inequality  
 
To set the scene, Figure 1 (taken from Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005a) plots out the salient 
features of the US full-time weekly wage distribution from 1963 through to 2003. At least 
three things stand out from Figure 1: 
First, educational wage differentials - measured as the gap in pay between college and 
high school educated workers - have risen consistently since 1979 (after falling somewhat in 
the 1970s and rising somewhat in the 1960s). The rate of increase was more rapid in the 
1980s than after 1992.1 
Second, the 90-10 wage differential - defined as the difference in weekly pay for 
those at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the overall wage distribution - has been rising since 
1976 (and maybe even earlier). 
Third, the “residual” 90-10 wage differential - the difference between those at the 90th 
and 10th percentiles of the overall wage distribution after controlling for education, 
experience and gender - has risen consistently since 1967, especially after the mid 1970s (see 
Juhn et al, 1993). This increase in “within group” wage inequality has also generated much 
excitement and interest from theorists, but is particularly hard to interpret in the light of 
compositional changes (Lemieux, 2006).  
The overall picture is one of a dramatic increase in American wage inequality since 
1979. Different measures of inequality do give some different patterns – for example, 
educational wage premia fell in the 1970s when residual (and total) wage inequality was 
                                                 
1 This ongoing secular rise in educational wage premia is also seen in the hourly wage series from March 
outgoing rotation group of the Current Population Survey (CPS) – see Lemieux (2006). 
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rising. It is also the case that hourly wages (as measured by the May outgoing rotation groups 
in the Current Population Survey) show less of an increase in overall and residual wage 
inequality after the late 1980s (for reasons that are still not completely understood). What the 
various data sources agree on, however, is that educational wage premia have risen 
consistently throughout the period.  
 
2.2 Comparing the UK with the US 
 
Table 1 contrasts the US experience with that of the UK, another country where wage 
inequality has risen dramatically. We focus on the period from 1979 onwards where most 
changes have taken place. Panel A shows annual real wage growth at several different 
percentile points of the UK and US wage distributions for all full-time workers.2 The 1980s 
shows a clear picture in both countries: wage growth was more pronounced at higher points 
of the distribution and this is almost monotonic in both counties, leading to large increases in 
wage inequality. The lower panel shows that in the 1980s the 90-10 expanded by 1.9 
percentage points a year in both countries. An important difference, however, is that in the 
UK there was positive wage growth throughout the distribution whereas in the US workers in 
the bottom quartile actually had zero or negative wage growth.  
The picture is more complex post 1990. In both countries the 90-50 continues to 
diverge (“upper tail inequality”) whereas the 50-10 (“lower tail inequality”) in the US 
actually shrinks, indicating some wage compression. In the UK the 50-10 is stable (increasing 
a bit in the 1990s and shrinking a bit in the 2000s). Overall then, the increase in wage 
inequality has been stronger in the upper tail than the lower tail taking the period as a whole 
and has been more pronounced in the 1980s than post 1990. 
Another way of looking at the trends is to examine the growth of employment in 
“good jobs” and “bad jobs” (defined here as high wage and low wage jobs). Figure 2 shows 
the change in the employment for jobs ranked by their position in the 1979 wage distribution 
for the UK. As expected we see a significant growth in well paid “good jobs” at the upper tail 
of the distribution – lawyers, senior managers and consultants. But we also see an increase in 
low-paid “bad jobs” in the lower tail of the distribution – cleaners, hair dressers, shop 
assistants and burger flippers. This is consistent with a “polarization” of the labor market. In 
the 1990s especially it seems that the middle of the distribution seemed to do somewhat 
worse than those at the top or bottom. Similar findings have been reported on US and 
German data (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006; Spitz-Oener, 2006). 
A final similarity between the two countries that stands out in Table 1 is the 
continuous and rapid growth of wages at the very top of the distribution. British wage growth 
at the 95th percentile is greater than the other percentiles in the Table in the 1980s, 1990s and 
2000s. This is also true for the US (except for the 10th percentile in the 1990s). So within the 
picture of overall rising inequality the very rich have done particularly well. 
 
2.3 The Experience of Other Countries 
 
There is less systematic evidence for the evolution of the wage distribution outside of the US 
and UK, especially for more recent years. Table 2 uses OECD data to show 90-10 male wage 
ratio for a range of countries between 1980 and 2000. Broadly speaking the 1980s rise in 
inequality was seen only in the UK and US and in specific countries where particular 
episodes to move to a much more market oriented economy occurred (notably New Zealand). 
                                                 
2 The US numbers square up well with those from the CPS May/ORG samples in Autor, Katz and Kearney 
(2005a). The numbers in Table 1 are for men and women together, whereas Autor, Katz and Kearney report 
inequality numbers for men and women separately. 
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Elsewhere wage inequality did not alter much. The 1990s is a little different, for example 
with there being evidence of widening wage structures starting to occur in places previously 
characterised by stable wage structures – Germany is a very good example of this. Moreover, 
as we discuss below, the Continental European countries did have a larger increase in 
unemployment which may be due to the same underlying forces that have pushed up wage 
inequality in Britain and America. 
 
 
3. Explanations of Changes in Wage Inequality 
 
A natural place to begin to analyze the observed changes in the wage structure is to consider 
a model of changes in supply and demand. We then need to incorporate institutional features 
(such as minimum wages and trade unions) into the model.  
 
3.1 Sources of Skill Premia: Supply and Demand 
 
Consider Figure 3 as a basic model of wage determination. We assume full employment and 
competitive labor markets. The initial equilibrium wage differential between skilled workers 
(Ws) and unskilled workers (Wu) is denoted (Ws/Wu)o. This is determined by the intersection 
of the relative demand curve for skills (Do) and the relative supply curve for skills (So). This 
equilibrium is associated with an initial relative employment ratio of skilled to unskilled 
workers (Ns/Nu)o. Now assume that a shock to the relative demand curve shifts Do to the right 
to D1. The new relative wage equilibrium is (Ws/Wu)1 and the new relative employment level 
is (Ns/Nu)1. At the new equilibrium we observe greater wage inequality and a relatively 
higher employment of skilled to unskilled workers. 
At a first pass this is broadly consistent with the stylized facts of the previous section. 
Where an increase in relative wages between more and less educated workers has occurred 
this has gone on hand in hand with an increase in the relative employment of educated 
workers. In Table 3, for example, the proportion of graduates grew from 20.8% in 1980 to 
34.2% in 2004 in the US.3 The equivalent figures from the UK were even more dramatic – 
the growth in graduates was from 5% to 21% over the same time period. The only way to 
reconcile these facts in the standard model is through a shift in the relative demand curve for 
skills. 
A simple way to formalise this is in the context of a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function with two labor inputs: 
ρρρ αα 1]))(1()([ tuttsttt bNNaQ −+=  (1) 
In (1) aggregate output is Q and is produced with college educated equivalent skilled labor 
( sN ) and high school educated equivalent unskilled labor ( uN ) in period t. The parameters a 
and b represent skilled and unskilled augmenting technical change, α  indexes the share of 
work activities of skilled labor and ρ is a parameter that determines the elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labor ( ρσ −= 1
1 ). Skill biased technological 
changes involve increases in a/b or α . 
                                                 
3 In the US the graduate measure is having a bachelor’s degree or higher (i.e. excluding people with some 
college who do not get a degree). 
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Assuming college and high school equivalents are paid their marginal product we can 
use equation (1) to solve for the ratio of marginal products of the two types of labor, Ws/Wu , 
and relative supplies of labor, us NN / , in year t as: 
])/ln()[/1()/ln( tusttus NNDWW −= σ  (2) 
 
where 
])/ln())1/([ln( tttt baD ραασ +−=  (3) 
is a relative demand index of shifts favoring college equivalents and is measured in log 
quantity units. The impact of changes in relative skill supplies ( us NN / ) depends on the 
elasticity of substitution, σ. The larger is this parameter the bigger will be the effects of 
supply changes on relative wages. Equation (3) shows that changes in D can arise from 
(disembodied) skill biased technical change, non-neutral changes in relative prices or 
quantities of non-labor inputs and shifts in product demand. 
Katz and Murphy (1992) implemented an empirical version of equation (2) replacing 
D with a linear time trend for US data between 1963 and 1987. They estimate: 
ttustus vNNtrendWW +++= )/ln()/ln( 210 γγγ  (4) 
finding 2γˆ to be significantly negative (equal to -.709), implying an elasticity of substitution of 
about 1.4 (σ = -1/ 2γˆ = 1.41), with a significant trend increase in the college premium of 3.3% 
per annum ( 1γˆ  = .033). Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005a) use (differently filtered) data from 
1963 to 2003 to estimate the same model and find a similar substitution elasticity of σ = 1.6, 
but with a lower trend growth of the college premium of 2% per annum. Although, as 
discussed above, there appeared to be a slowdown in demand growth for skilled workers in 
the 1990s relative to the 1980s, the main point is that there appears to be a systematic demand 
shift towards more skilled workers throughout the four last decades of the 20th century. 
This is not to suggest that supply side changes are unimportant. Deviations of relative 
skill supplies from the trend are negatively associated with deviations of the relative wage 
from trend as suggested by 2γ <0. The slowdown of the growth of education in more recent 
cohorts is certainly one factor in accounting for the increase in inequality as shown by Card 
and Lemieux (2001). But the most important factor over the longer run in accounting for the 
growth in educational wage differentials appears to be the trend demand shift towards the 
more skilled. The critical question then becomes: what could account for this change? 
 
3.2 The Cause of Relative Demand Shifts: Technology or Trade? 
 
To date, the two main explanations for the demand shift towards the more skilled are skill 
biased technological change (SBTC) and increased international trade. We examine each of 
these in turn. 
 
3.2.1. Skill Biased Technological Change 
 
Equation (3) above directly relates the change in the skill premia to SBTC. The idea is that 
new technologies such as information and communication technologies (ICTs) are 
complementary with the skills of more educated workers. More educated workers may find it 
easier to cope with the uncertainty surrounding new technologies in general or it may be that 
they have a particular advantage in using IT effectively. Rapid falls in the quality adjusted 
prices of IT or a more rapid investment in new technologies (e.g. from higher R&D 
intensities) could therefore have shifted demand towards more skilled workers.  
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There is now abundant empirical evidence that suggests that SBTC is an important 
and international phenomenon (e.g. see the survey in Bond and Van Reenen, 2006). A typical 
analysis estimates the following cost share equation: 
eWWYKTECHSHARE us ++∆+=∆ )/ln()/ln( 321 βββ  (5) 
where SHARE is the wage bill share of skilled workers, TECH is a measure of technical 
change, K is the capital stock, Y is value added, Ws/Wu is relative wages, ∆ the difference 
operator and e an error term. This relationship can be derived from the stochastic form of a 
translog short-run variable cost function with labor as the two variables and fixed and 
technological capital as the two fixed factors (e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches, 1994). The 
test of skill biased technical change is whether 1β >0, and the overwhelming preponderance 
of evidence supports this finding. 
An example of the genre is Machin and Van Reenen (1998) who examine this 
relationship using manufacturing data across many industries in seven OECD countries (the 
US, UK, France, Japan, Germany, Denmark and Sweden) in the 1970s and 1980s. In all of 
the countries examined they found that demand was shifting more quickly towards skilled 
workers in the more technologically advanced industries (i.e. 1β >0 in equation (5)). This was 
robust to using either occupation or education as a measure of skills; using either R&D 
intensity or computer use as a measure of technology and instrumenting own R&D with 
frontier (US) R&D. In most countries they also found evidence of capital-skill 
complementarity ( 2β >0). Estimating versions of equation (5) in other countries, in non-
manufacturing sectors (e.g. Autor, Katz and Krueger, 1998) and on more disaggregated plant 
level data (e.g. Doms, Dunne and Troske, 1997) also appears to uncover evidence of SBTC. 
Further evidence on SBTC comes from considering whether one can identify common 
patterns of cross-country change. In particular, if one sees faster skill demand shifts occurring 
in the same sorts of industries in different countries one may view this as informing the 
SBTC hypothesis (to the extent that similar industries in different countries utilize similar 
technologies). Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) looked at country by country pairwise 
correlations of industry skill demand shifts for the same industries in different countries 
(using data from the United Nations Industrial Statistics database for twelve countries. They 
found that most industrial demand shifts covary positively across countries, in line with the 
notion that SBTC matters. 
A less used alternative to test for SBTC is to regress the adoption of technologies on 
skill prices (i.e. when skilled workers wage rise relative to unskilled workers this should 
depress the incentive to adopt new technologies) or skilled labor supply. Some evidence for 
this method is in Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) and Doms and Lewis (2006) and also 
supports SBTC. A third method is to directly estimate the production function or the cost 
function underlying the factor demand equation (5). This has also tended to uncover evidence 
of skill-technology complementarity (e.g. Bresnahan et al, 2002). 
Finally some authors have directly regressed individual wages on computer use or 
controlling for other factors (e.g. Krueger, 1993). This is a rather unsatisfactory test of SBTC, 
however, as computers are likely to be allocated to more productive workers as has been 
found by several studies (Chennells and Van Reenen, 1997; DiNardo and Pischke, 1997). 
This method therefore conflates selection and SBTC. 
Although we have stated the SBTC hypothesis in quite a blunt fashion the influence 
of technical change is almost certainly more nuanced as detailed case studies suggest 
(Blanchard, 2004). For one, new technologies typically present opportunities to increase 
productivity if firms are able to successfully invest in re-organizing their firm (e.g. through 
decentralizing or delayering hierarchies). Some econometric studies suggest that it is these 
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organizational changes that are typically associated with increased demand for skilled 
workers (Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001; Bresnahan et al, 2002).  
In a related vein, computerization does not simply involve increasing all skill demand 
but it substitutes for different types of tasks. For example, “routine” manual tasks such as 
working on a production line have been increasingly replaced by automated IT. By contrast, 
non-routine analytical tasks performed by consultants and academic economists have been 
helped by this routinization. This is the classical SBTC mechanism increasing the relative 
demand for the more skilled non-manuals relative to blue collar workers. But routine non-
manual tasks such as clerical work have also been replaced by computers and these clerical 
workers are more in the middle of the income distribution. By contrast, some non-routine 
manual tasks such as cleaning at the bottom of the wage distribution are largely unaffected by 
IT. Using detailed information on occupational tasks Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) show 
the quantitative importance of this phenomenon. As expected, computerization is connected 
with a decrease in demand for manual and non-manual routine skills, but an increase in 
demand for analytic skills. Building on this, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) show how a 
model where IT replaces routine tasks can rationalize the experience of the 1990s where there 
appeared to be a polarization of jobs with the “middle” of the wage distribution suffering at 
the expense of the bottom as well as the top. 
Overall then there is strong support for the importance of SBTC.  Some critics (most 
strongly expressed in Card and DiNardo, 2002) argue that SBTC cannot be the reason for 
increased inequality because technical change is continuous whereas the change in wage 
inequality is episodic. Regardless of whether one agrees with the characterisation of technical 
change, this misses the point that SBTC is meant to account for the longer-run pressure to 
increase skill demand (the D in equation (2)) and not necessarily the “twist” in the 1980s. 
Similarly the fact that inequality growth slowed down post 1995 whereas productivity growth 
accelerated does not “disprove” the SBTC argument as the speed of technical change is 
simply not the same as the bias of technical change. 
 
3.2.2 Increased International Trade 
 
At first glance, the simple Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade offers a seemingly cogent 
explanation of why unskilled workers have fared badly in recent decades. Less developed 
countries such as China and India have become integrated into the global economy as trade 
barriers, transportation and communication costs have fallen. Unskilled workers in the OECD 
counties now have to compete not only with workers at home but also with a large number of 
workers overseas. The influx of cheap goods produced with low skill labor puts downward 
pressure on the wages and employment opportunities of unskilled workers in the West and is 
responsible for the shift in labor demand in Figure 3. 
To model this we explicitly consider two regions: “North”, which is skill abundant 
and “South” which is unskilled abundant. There are four industries: tradable high skill 
intensive, tradable low skill intensive, non-tradable high skill intensive and non-tradable low 
skill intensive. The Stolper-Samuelson theory establishes that relative wages in each country 
will depend on relative output prices of the tradable industries: the higher the relative price of 
the skill intensive good the higher the relative wage of the skilled workers. What happens 
when a small open economy in the North moves from autarky to free trade? The removal of 
trade barriers increases the relative price of the skill intensive good and this means the skill 
premium rises in the North.  
Although this model is coherent, it also offers several other predictions which turn out 
to be at odds with the data (see Desjonqueres, Machin and Van Reenen, 1999, for extensive 
discussion of these predictions). First, the increasing specialisation of the North in skill 
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intensive goods under free trade means that employment should shift between industries to 
skill intensive industries. But because relative skill prices have risen we should expect to see 
that employment within industries shifts towards (the cheaper) unskilled workers. 
Decompositions of the increase in the aggregate employment share of skilled workers, 
however, almost all show that within industries there has been a strong shift towards skilled 
workers. This might be because the level of aggregation of industries is too high, but more 
disaggregated industries and even firm level studies suggest that a sizeable proportion is 
“within”. Even more convincingly, Desjonqueres et al (1999) show that non-traded sectors - 
such as hotels and wholesale outlets - also show a shift towards skilled workers (and an 
increase in the educational wage premium). This pattern of within industry shifts is consistent 
with general SBTC, but inconsistent with the basic trade theory. 
A second prediction of the basic trade model is that wage differentials should fall in 
developing countries as there is effectively an increase in skilled labor supply from the North. 
There is no evidence that such a compression has occurred: if anything most developing 
countries studied appear to also have experienced a growth in skill premia.  
Thirdly, we should observe that relative prices of the unskilled-intensive sectors 
should fall rapidly in the North. There is some evidence for this in the US but there is no 
significant relationship for any other country (at least until the mid 1990s). Even in the US 
the evidence from Krueger (1996) is that this relationship was only apparent after 1989 when 
wage inequality grew slowly. 
Finally, naïve regressions that include import penetration and other trade variables in 
equation (5) generally find no role for these trade variables (e.g. Machin and Van Reenen, 
1998). This does not take into account the general equilibrium effects underlying the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model of course. 
Overall there is little support for the trade-based explanation of demand shifts. There 
are two caveats to this conclusion. First, most of these studies were based on data prior to 
1995 when China started to become more of a major exporter. Second, trade might induce 
some of the skill biased technological change discussed in the previous section as suggested 
by Acemoglu (2002). As far as we know there is no empirical evidence on this speculation 
either way. 
 
3.3 Labor Market Institutions 
 
In research trying to reconcile cross-country differences in change in wage inequality, an 
emphasis has been placed upon the role of labor market institutions that affect wages 
differently in different places. There are several features of this work, ranging from studies 
that look in detail across countries to those which focus on the role played by particular 
labour market institutions like minimum wages or trade unions.  
 
3.3.1 Cross Country Evidence 
 
As discussed in section 2 the wages structure in OECD countries has evolved in many 
different ways in the last 30 years. The rise in inequality was much stronger in the Anglo-
Saxon countries (e.g. the US and UK) than elsewhere (e.g. France, Germany and Japan). 
Although the technology and/or trade shocks discussed in the previous sub-sections should 
affect all countries, the Continental European and Japanese economies have experienced a 
much greater increase in unemployment than the US since the late 1970s. One view is that 
European unemployment and American inequality are “two sides of the same coin” – 
institutional rigidities (and perhaps generous welfare benefits) placed a floor under the wages 
of unskilled workers in Continental Europe, so as technology and globalisation forced low 
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skilled American workers to accept lower wages, in Europe the equivalent less skilled 
individuals lost their jobs.4 
This is probably too crude. Nickell and Bell (1995) have shown that relative 
unemployment rates between skilled and unskilled workers did not rise by as much as would 
be expected in this simple model. Similarly, the cross country correlation between the growth 
in unemployment and earnings inequality is not very strong (e.g. Burniaux et al, 2006). 
Finally, European countries may have been better at keeping up the growth of supply of the 
quantity and quality of skills than in the US and UK (although Table 3 shows that skill 
expansion in the UK was very rapid).  
At the very least, the fact that wage inequality has not risen in the countries where 
minimum wages and/or union power remained strong suggests that institutions do have an 
important role to play. 
 
3.3.2 Minimum Wages 
 
There is much evidence that minimum wages compress wage differentials (DiNardo et al, 
1996). In the US the real value of the Federal minimum wage fell significantly during the 
1980s and some authors argue that this can account for all of the change in wage inequality 
(e.g. Lee, 1999). By the same token the uprating of the Minimum wage in the 1990s helps 
explain the slowdown in wage inequality. As Card and DiNardo (2002) emphasis the time 
series pattern is very strong – see Figure 4 (taken from Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2005a). 
A problem with the “purely institutional” argument, however, is that it seems highly 
unlikely that the minimum wage can explain what is happening in the top half of the wage 
distribution. Analysis of the minimum wage suggests that the impact on workers above 
median wages is close to zero. Nevertheless, the most striking finding of the analysis in 
Section 2 was that there appeared to be a secular increase in the 90-50 wage ratio since the 
late 1970s in the US (and the UK). It is hard to reconcile these facts with the view that the 
minimum wage can explain all the change in the wage distribution. Similarly, when Autor, 
Katz and Kearney (2005a) add the minimum wage to equation (4) although it has the 
expected negative sign, it does little to reduce the long-run unexplained relative demand shift 
towards higher education wage differentials.  
Where the institutional story does better is in accounting for the dramatic increase in 
residual wage inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution in the 1980s. This 
residual wage change was more episodic and the majority of the change is plausibly 
accounted for by the minimum wage (and compositional effects – see below). 
Another problem with the pure minimum wage explanation is that wage floors 
changed much less in other countries where wage inequality also rose. For example in the 
UK, the minimum wage system that operated at the time when wage inequality rose (the 
“Wage Councils”) only covered a relatively small proportion of the workforce (around 12% 
at the time of abolition in 1993). Furthermore, during the 1993-1999 time period when all 
non-agricultural minimum wages were abolished in the UK, wage inequality at the lower end 
actually started to stabilise (Dickens, Machin and Manning, 1999; Machin and Manning, 
1994). 
 
                                                 
4 There is a also a new, growing body of work arguing that tastes and social norms are important for explaining 
cross-country patterns of change (see, amongst others, Benabou and Tirole, 2006). 
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3.3.3 Trade Unions 
 
As with minimum wages there is robust evidence that unions act to compress wage 
differentials (e.g. Freeman, 1980; Card, 1996). Since unions have declined in the US and the 
UK, this may be another institutional mechanism putting upwards pressure on wage 
inequality. Unionization rates fell from 25% to 15% between 1979 and 1998 in the US and 
from 53% to 31% in the UK over the same period. Gosling and Lemieux, (2004) argue that 
union decline can account for over a third of the increase in male wage inequality in both 
countries over the 1983-1998 period.  
As with the minimum wage explanation, it is rather difficult to evaluate these 
statistical decompositions as they are not based on an underlying economic model. But it 
does seem rather implausible that unions could be the major explanation in the US for the 
ongoing increase in the 90-50 ratio since (a) they comprise such a small part of the workforce 
and (b) their membership is mainly drawn from the bottom half of the wage distribution. 
 
3.4 Within Group Wage Inequality 
 
It was noted above (in Section 2) that within-group inequality has been rising consistently in 
the US. This observation has spawned a literature trying to pin down and better understand 
the reasons why. 
 
3.4.1 Skill Prices 
 
In an early contribution, Juhn et al (1993) argue that the increase in residual inequality 
reflects differences in skill prices. But this assumes a competitive model of the labor market 
that is somewhat at odds with the evidence from matched worker firm information that “firm 
effects” appear important even after controlling for observed and unobserved worker quality. 
 
3.4.2 Imperfect Competition 
 
An alternative set of theories has emerged that builds upon frictions in the labor market 
generating heterogeneous wages even for identical workers. Some more 
productive/technologically advanced firms may share quasi-rents with workers who are 
matched with them (e.g. Van Reenen, 1996). If the dispersion of these wage premia have 
increased over time this could lie behind the increase in residual wage inequality. For 
example, in Caselli (1999) firms experiment with the uncertain new technology and some of 
those who are successful obtain higher productivity, resulting in higher wages for the workers 
with whom they are matched. There is little hard empirical evidence on these theories 
although Faggio et al (2006) offer some evidence that firm productivity heterogeneity has 
increased and this is linked to firm wage inequality as Caselli’s model would suggest. 
 
3.4.3 Compositional Effects 
 
The increase in the proportion of the workers with more education can mechanically raise 
“within group” wage inequality because earnings variation is higher for those with college 
education relative to high school education (the same is true for experience). Lemieux (2006) 
argues that all of the post 1988 increase in residual wage inequality is due to these 
compositional effects. Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005b) analyze 90-50 and 50-10 
differentials separately and find a larger role for prices. Nevertheless, closer inspection of 
Figure 1 suggests that residual inequality increased far less after 1992 than before in the 
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March CPS data (and it hardly moves at all in the CPS May/ORG data studied in Autor at al, 
2005a). This implies that residual inequality may actually be less of an important 
phenomenon than is sometimes asserted. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
There has been a dramatic increase in wage inequality since the late 1970s in the US, UK and 
other Anglophone countries. A significant reason for this is the growth of wage differentials 
between educational groups. We have argued that the fundamental reason for this is a long-
run growth in the relative demand for skills driven by technology change (rather than trade). 
Changes in skill supply and institutional changes have affected the timing of how skill biased 
technical change the wage structure. The increase in US and UK inequality slowed down 
after 1990 but has continued to grow in the upper tail of the wage distribution, and wage 
inequality has started to rise in places previously characterised by stable wage structures (like 
Germany), indicating that changing patterns of wage inequality remain high on the research 
agenda of empirical economists.  
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Table 1:  Hourly Wage Inequality in the UK and US 
 
  
Changes in Hourly Wage Inequality (Full-Time Workers) 
 
 A. Real Wage Trends By Percentile (Annualised Percentage Points) 
  
UK 
 
US 
 
 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
 
5th percentile 1.8 1.0 3.0 -1.6 1.3 1.8 
10th percentile 1.6 1.1 2.6 -0.6 1.5 1.4 
25th percentile 1.8 1.2 2.3 0.0 0.9 0.4 
50th percentile 2.3 1.5 2.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 
75th percentile 3.0 1.9 2.8 0.6 1.0 1.6 
90th percentile 3.5 2.1 3.0 1.3 1.3 1.9 
95th percentile 3.8 2.2 3.5 2.0 1.3 1.9 
       
 B. Trends in Inequality Indices (Annualised Percentage Points) 
  
UK 
 
US 
  
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
 
1980s 
 
1990s 
 
2000s 
       
90-10 differential 1.9 1.0 0.4 1.9 -0.2 0.5 
90-50 differential 1.2 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.8 
10-50 differential -0.7 -0.4 0.2 -0.9 0.7 0.3 
95-90 differential 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 
5-10 differential -0.2 -0.1 0.4 -1.0 -0.2 0.4 
       
 
Notes: UK - derived from New Earnings Survey (NES); US - derived from Current 
Population Survey data (the Outgoing Rotation Group, ORG, data from NBER). The time 
periods used are:  1980s – 1979 to 1989; 1990s – 1989 to 1999; 2000s – 2000 to 2004.  
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Table 2:  Male 90-10 Wage Ratios Across Countries, 1980-2000 
 
 
 Male 90-10 Wage Ratios 
 1980 1990 2000 
 
Australia 
 
2.73 
 
2.71 
 
3.16 
Finland 2.44 2.57 2.47f 
France 3.38 3.46 3.28e 
Germany 2.53b 2.44 2.86e 
Italy 2.09b 2.38 2.44c 
Japan 2.60 2.84 2.74f 
Netherlands 2.32a 2.48 2.83f 
New Zealand 2.72 3.08 3.55d 
Sweden 2.11 2.07 2.35e 
UK 2.63b 3.24 3.40 
US 3.58 4.41 4.76 
 
 
Notes: Taken from OECD data web site 
(http://www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthenticate.asp).  Data is from different 
years as denoted by the following superscripts:  a – 1985; b – 1986; c – 1996; d - 1997; e – 
1998; f – 1999. 
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Table 3:  Aggregate Trends in Graduate/Non-Graduate 
Employment and Wages 
 
 UK US 
  
% Graduate Share of 
Employment 
 
 
Relative Weekly 
Wage (Full-Time) 
 
% Graduate Share 
of Employment 
 
Relative Weekly 
Wage (Full-Time) 
     
1980 5.0 1.48 20.8 1.41 
1985 9.8 1.50 24.2 1.53 
1990 10.2 1.60 25.7 1.60 
1995 14.0 1.60 31.8 1.65 
2000 17.2 1.64 31.8 1.69 
2004 21.0 1.64 34.2 1.66 
     
Changes:     
1980-2004 16.0 .16 13.4 .25 
1980-1990 5.2 .12 4.9 .19 
1990-2000 7.0 .04 6.1 .09 
2000-2004 3.8 .00 2.4 -.02 
     
 
Notes: UK - derived from General Household Survey (GHS) and Labour Force Survey 
(LFS); US - derived from Current Population Survey data. UK Updated from Machin and 
Vignoles (2005).  Sample includes all people aged 18-64 in work and earning, except for 
relative wages which are defined for full-time workers. The relative wage ratios are derived 
from coefficient estimates on a graduate dummy variable in semi-log earnings equations 
controlling for age, age squared and gender (they are the exponent of the coefficient on the 
graduate dummy). 
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Figure 1: Changes in US Wage Inequality, 1963-2003 
 
 
 
Source: Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005a) – based on full-time weekly earnings for all 
workers in the March Current Population Survey. 
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Figure 2: Good Jobs and Bad Jobs 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goos and Manning (2006) 
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Figure 3: Relative Wages and the Demand and Supply of Skills 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Equilibrium wage differentials (Ws/Wu)o begin at the intersection of the relative 
demand curve for skills (Do) and the relative supply curve for skills (So). This is associated 
with relative employment of skilled to unskilled workers of (Ns/Nu)o. A shock to the relative 
demand curve shifts Do to the right (D1). This increases the relative wage to (Ws/Wu)1 and the 
relative employment to (Ns/Nu)1. At the new equilibrium we observe greater wage inequality 
and a relatively higher employment of skilled to unskilled workers. 
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Figure 4: The Time Series Relationship between the US Federal Minimum Wage and 
Wage Inequality 
 
 
Source: Autor, Katz and Kearney (2005a). 
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